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3. Lax Financial Regulation and Non Co-Operative Countries: An Empirical 
Investigation 
 
In the previous paragraph we illustrated the following relationship in a formal 
framework: given the specific structural features and endowments of his own 
country, a policymaker may find it rational to design lax financial regulations in 
order to attract capital of illegal origin.  
The policymaker finds it advantageous to transform his country into an LFR 
jurisdiction because, in defining its objective function, the national economic 
benefits expected from offering money-laundering services are greater than the 
expected national costs associated with the internal risk of developing terrorism 
and organized crime, the international risk of loss of reputation and, finally, the 
possibility of a sanction by the international community. Therefore, peculiar 
economic and social country endowments can increase the probability of having 
lax financial regulation. 
Now, how we can test this relationship? In the real world, the international 
community considers LFR countries as potential non-cooperative jurisdictions 
(NCCTs) in the fight against money laundering. Therefore we can assume that the 
NCCT jurisdictions share common structural features; we can test this hypothesis 
using econometric techniques.  
In particular, since the international context (i.e. the technical and political 
enforcement described in our model) is constant, we can assume that:  
 
·  An NCCT jurisdiction will be one that, in terms of economic 
characteristics, has relatively scant physical resources to spend in 
international trade, and that this is the first channel of national benefit  
expected from lax  financial regulation ;  
· At the same time, an NCCT jurisdiction has the potential for developing 
financial services, fundamental for money-laundering purposes, and this is 
the second channel of national benefit expected from lax financial 
regulation ; 
· An NCCT jurisdiction also has social characteristics that shield it to some 
extent from the risks of terrorism and/or of organized crime, thus reducing 
the expected cost of lax financial regulation; 
 
Now the time has come to analyze the NCCT jurisdictions. Since 22 June 2000, the 
FATF has been publishing a periodic report on the NCCT jurisdictions: the 
blacklist. The report lays down 25 criteria, plus eight recent special 
recommendations on terrorist financing, that, if violated, identify the national rules 
that in each country are detrimental to international cooperation in the fight against 
money laundering. From June 2000 to February 2004, 45 countries have been 
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monitored, and nine blacklists have been published, indicating the jurisdictions that 
fail to conform to the criteria. 
Having identified a sample of NCCT jurisdictions, it is possible to perform some 
econometric exercises. Using a worldwide data set on the main 130 countries18 ,  
we do a Probit analysis. The dependent variable is  a Binary Probit Variable equal 
to 1 for the 45 potential NCCTs and 0 otherwise.  
The best estimated equation19 is as follows: 
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where:  
 
A1 = Landuse20;  
B1 = GDP per capita21; 
C1 = Foreign deposits per Capita22;   
E1 = Terrorism and organized crime23  Index24. 
                                                                 
18 Given the 267 world countries (UN members=180), our 130 countries (BRI sample) 
represent the 98% of the world GDP and the 90% of the world population. 
19 Masciandaro and Portolano (2004). 
20 Landuse: This entry contains the percentage shares of total land area for five different 
types of land use: arable land - land cultivated for crops that are replanted after each 
harvest like wheat, maize, and rice; permanent crops - land cultivated for crops that are 
not replanted after each harvest like citrus, coffee, and rubber; permanent pastures  - land 
permanently used for herbaceous forage crops; forests and woodland - land under dense or 
open stands of trees; other - any land type not specifically mentioned above, such as urban 
areas. Source: Central Intelligence Agency. 
21 Gdp-capita: This entry shows GDP on a purchasing power parity basis divided by 
population (year 2001). Source: Central Intelligence Agency 
22 Fordepositscapita: The data on foreign deposits are derived from reporting as such or 
calculated by subtracting separately reported data on positions other than deposits from 
total external assets and liabilities. The only exception is the Netherlands Antilles, which 
does not provide this information separately (year 2001).  Source: BRI. The deposit data 
are then divided by the popolation (year 2001). 
23 Regarding the Organized Crime Dummy, the size of the drug market dimension is 
evidently an indirect and imperfect indicator of the organized crime problem. At the same 
time, the drug market has given organized crime its massive resources. It has been 
correctly noted that during the ‘70s the drug trade became far too profitable and easy for 
even traditional and "conservative" organized crime organisations to ignore (see Rider 
(2002), pag.17), Furthermore, it is also noted there that even terrorist groups entered the 
market and by so doing became virtually indistinguishable from "ordinary" organized 
crime. 
24 Terrorism and Organized Crime Index: we built this variable by summing two separate 
variables for each country: Organized Crime Dummy = 1 if there is drug production 
and/or drug markets in the country, 0 otherwise (Source: CIA); Normalized Terrorism 
Indicator =  average number of  terrorist episodes in the country (years 1968-91)  / max 
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 Table 2 Binary Laxity Index determinants (130 countries and territories) 
 
 
Dependent variable                 Binary  Laxity Index  
Landuse                                             0.0079108 ****                                            
                                                         (0.003060)                                    
Gdpcapita                                       -0.0000723****                       
                                                       (0.0000190)                              
Fordepositcapita                              3.18E-06****                        
                                                       (1.36E-06)                               
Terrorismorgcrime                        - 0.5737521**** 
                                                       (0.2436112) 
 
STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES. SUPERSCRIPT ASTERISKS INDICATE 
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AT 0.01 (****), 0.02 (***), 0.05 (**), 0.10 (*).  
 
 
The econometric results (Table 2) seem interesting, generally confirming that the 
probability of being an NCCT jurisdiction will depend on specific country 
endowments .  
 
Firstly we note that the probability a country will become an NCCT jurisdiction 
tends to be higher the more it experiences economic growth problems, measuring 
those problems in terms of per-capita GDP and the level of land exploitation. This 
variable represents a proxy of the first channel of national laxity benefits . 
 
Secondly we note that the probability a country will become an NCCT jurisdiction 
tends to be higher the more it has developed the flow of foreign deposits. This 
variable represents a proxy of the second channel of national laxity benefits. 
 
Thirdly we use a joint Index of the terrorism risks and organized crime risks. In our 
approach, every national policymaker cares about both risks, and lax financial 
                                                                                                                                                      
average number of terrorist episodes in a country  (1968-91); the Terrorism indicator 
therefore ranges from 0 to 1 (Source: Blomberg). Consequently, our Index ranges from 0 
to 2 
Data Sources; Central Intelligence Agency – www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook; 
Democracy Index – www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/3535/country/list-di.htm; 
Foreign Bank Deposits: Bank for International Settlements – 
www.bri.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa0206.pdf#page=44; ;  Terrorism Indicators, see Blomberg 
B.S., Hess D.G., Weerapana A., Terrorism From Within: An Economic Model of 
Terrorism, May 2002 and  ITERATE Data Set. 
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regulation can benefit in principle either terrorism or organized crime. In fact we 
note that the probability a country will become an NCCT jurisdiction tends to be 
higher as the degree of terrorism and organized crime risks decrease . We must 
point out that we have found no data for testing the role of international reputation 
sensitivity (Proposition Five)25. 
 
It is possible to do a further step if we hypothesize different levels of non-
cooperative attitude. We can transform in an order probit variable Table 3) the fact 
that the 45 NCCTs jurisdictions have different stories: countries just monitored by 
the FAFT (non-cooperative attitude =1), countries with at least one presence in the 
black list (non-cooperative attitude=2), and finally the countries that actually 
remain in the black list (non-cooperative attitude=3)26; the non-cooperative attitude 
is obviously 0 for the other 85 countries of the sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
25 Obviously we cannot use a cross-country analysis to test the role of international 
economic and political enforcement, since from the standpoint of traditional economic 
policy the variables are not country-specific, while from the standpoint of new political 
economics, they should be more testable prima facie using country case studies. 
26 The following list of NCCTs is current and was last changed on February 2004: Cook 
Islands, Guatemala, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nigeria, Philippines . 
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Table 3 Ordered  Laxity Index (OLI) 
 Countries OLI 
1 Antigua 1 
2 Bahamas 2 
3 Barbuda 1 
4 Belize 1 
5 Bermuda 1 
6 British Virgin I. 1 
7 Cayman I. 2 
8 Cook I. 3 
9 Cyprus 1 
10 Czeck Republic 1 
11 Egypt 2 
12 Dominica 1 
13 Gilbratar  1 
14 Grenada 2 
15 Guatemala 3 
16 Guernsey  1 
17 Hungary 2 
18 Indonesia 3 
19 Isle of Man 1 
20 Israel 2 
21 Jersey  1 
22 Lebanon  2 
23 Liechtenstein  2 
24 Malta 1 
25 Marshall I. 2 
26 Mauritius 1 
27 Monaco 1 
28 Myanamar 3 
29 Nauru 3 
30 Nigeria        3 
31 Niue 2 
32 Panama         2 
33 Philippines 3 
34 Poland 1 
35 Russia 2 
36 Samoa 1 
37 Seychelles 1 
38 Slovak Rep. 1 
39 St. Kitts  Nevis 2 
40 St. Lucia 1 
41 St. Vincent 2 
42 Turk Caicos 1 
43 Ukraine 2 
44 Uruguay 1 
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45 Vanuatu 1 
 
 
We carry out an Ordered Probit analysis with the following results( Table3): 
 
Table 3 Ordered  Laxity Index determinants (130 countries and territories) 
 
 
Dependent variable                 Ordered  Laxity Index    
Landuse                                             0.0135717 ****               0.0144398 ****                                       
                                                         (0.0049385)                     (0.0049597)            
Gdpcapita                                       -0.0000523****                -0.0000527 ****      
                                                       (0.0000155)                       (0.0000161) 
Fordepositcapita                              8.86E-08***                      9.04E-08***  
                                                       (3.98E-08)                           (4.05E-08)   
Terrorismorgcrime                        - 0.3313072 
                                                       (0.2245221) 
 
Organized crime                                                                          - 0.4018445* 
                                                                                                      (0.2414516)                                
Terrorism                                                                                       0.0099674 
                                                                                                      (0.0293882) 
 
 
STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES. SUPERSCRIPT ASTERISKS INDICATE 
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AT 0.01 (****), 0.02 (***), 0.05 (**), 0.10 (*).  
 
The regression confirms the robustness of the two channels of national laxity 
benefits, while the proxy of the terrorism and organized crime risks has the right 
sign, but it is not significant. If we split the organized crime dummy from the 
terrorism dummy, we find that the non-cooperative attitude is inversely related 
with the organized crime risk. 
 
Finally, the econometric analysis allows us to affirm that the non-cooperative 
attitude does not coincide with the harmful tax competition attitude. While there is 
a theoretical presumption that international tax evasion and money laundering 
through offshore centres should overlap27, this is not necessarily the case.  
 
We carried out another Probit analysis where the dependent variable is now an 
Offshore Binary Probit Variable, that is equal to 1 for the OECD offshore countries 
and 0 otherwise28 (Table 4). 
                                                                 
27 Yaniv (1994) and (1999),  Alworth and Masciandaro (2004). 
28 Alworth and Masciandaro (2004). 
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 Table 4 Comparing Binary Offshore Index  and Binary Laxity determinants 
(130 countries and territories) 
 
Dependent Variable Binary Laxity Index Binary Offshore Index 
Landuse 0.007*** 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Gdpcapita -7.07E-05**** 
(1.92E-05) 
-2.04E-07 
(2.60E-07) 
Fordepostcapita 3.18E-06**** 
(1.36E-06) 
1.71E-06 
(1.33E-08) 
Terrorismorgcrime -0.508*** 
(0.224) 
-1.888**** 
(0.448) 
STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESIS. SUPERSCRIPT ASTERISKS INDICATE STATISTICA L 
SIGNIFICANCE AT 0.01 (****),  0.02 (***), 0.05  (**), 0.10 (*).   
 
As can be see, with the exception of the crime and terrorism index, none of 
variables have any explanatory power. This seems to suggest that the underlying 
economic characteristics of offshore centres and our NCCTs tend to differ. In 
general, therefore, we can reject the hypothesis that the causes of lax financial 
regulation decisions and of offshore activities are exactly  the same. 
 
In conclusion, the non-cooperative attitude seems to be dependent on key structural 
features of the country. Now, what are the consequences of our analysis on the 
debate concerning the effectiveness of blacklisting procedures? 
 
 
4. Conclusions. Is Blacklisting an Effective Device?  
 
In this paper we theoretically discuss and empirically test the relationships between 
specific country features, policymaker choices toward lax financial regulation, and 
national non-cooperative attitude with respect to the international effort to combat 
money-laundering phenomena. Our results suggest two main prescriptions for 
designing international policies aimed at reducing the global risks of terrorism and 
organized crime. These prescriptions can help to identify a possible role for the G8 
countries in combating black money. 
First of all, a pure and just formal “name and shame” approach may even prove 
counterproductive. Assuming that the international community is capable of 
effectively singling out NCCT jurisdictions that are indeed involved in black 
money schemes, a cautious approach is still deemed necessary. When the 
